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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
BRYANT S. JACOBS and BARBARA
T. JACOBS, his wife; DARRELL G.
HAFEN and RAQUEL E. HAFEN,
his wife; B.Y.U. EMPLOYEE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; and ROADRUNNER INN, INC., a corporation,

Case No.
9949

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The respondent, in September, 1962, commenced an
action in the District Court of Washington County to expropriate, under the laws of eminent domain, property as
to which the appellants owned or claimed an interest. Upon
responsive pleadings being filed by appellants and stipulations received acknowledging the right of the respondent
to condemn, public necessity as well as proper design of
the public improvement, a trial was had with respect to:
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(a) Determination of legal interests of the appellants, respectively, in the condemned acreage; and
(b) Evaluation of the condemned tract and compensation to be paid for the acquisition.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The interests of the appellants having been adjudicated
and the jury empaneled having returned to Court its special
verdict, the Honorable C. Nelson Day, District Judge, on
the 22nd day of April, 1963, entered judgment in favor of
the appellants and against the respondent for the sum of
$16,000.00, together with interest and costs. The appellants
prosecute this appeal from that judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the judgment and determination of the lower court should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' account of the record and facts in the lower
Court is distorted and disjointed; in more than one instance,
it has been made to appear that testimony, statements of
counsel, and evidentiary rulings were unbroken when, in
point of fact, each circumstance was foreign to the other
in time and subject matter (see app. Brief, pp. 14 and 15,
17, 18, 19, 20, and 21; and pp. 25, 26, 31, and 32). This
"scissors and paste" job leaves such a breach in a full presentment of the proceedings that respondent deems it necessary to capsulize the testimony and evidence bearing
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s
upon the issues on appeal, disregarding the statement of
appellants.
Incident to the construction and development of the
Interstate Highway System, the State of Utah, in September, 1962, filed a complaint in the District Court to condemn farm property located in Washington County be~
tween the towns of Middleton and Washington (R. 1-7),
the land described in the complaint as Parcel No. 162A
being a fraction of the Israel Neilson farm as originally
constituted. The condemned tract comprised 33.33 acres
and was wholly situate within an agricultural and grazing
zone of Washington County (Ex. P-8, Tr. 376 Vol. C) and
had so been for years prior thereto (Ex. P-8, Tr. 163 Vol.
B); the acquisition by the public transgressed the larger
Neilson parcel in a direction approximating northeast to
southwest, the physical characteristics of the entire tract,
prior to the taking, being displayed by the aerial photograph introduced at the trial (Ex. P-3 and maps, R. 7-8).
The design of the improvement called for the establishment of two 12' arterial traffic lanes in each direction
(Tr. 76); in addition, a freeway-interchange was to be
constructed on Parcel No. 162A providing for an ancillary
network of exit and feeder "ramp" roads to and from the
main channels of traffic, said interchange providing access
to a frontage road to the north of the freeway proper and
to "present" Highway 91 at the south (Tr. 75, 77-81, see
aerial photo, Ex. P-3). Upon completion of the highway
facility, the Neilson property will surround the interchange
area at all points (Exs. 2 and 3).
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Preliminarily to trial on issues of value, damages and
compensation, interlocutory questions of title to residual
lands and that under appropriation were determined (Tr.
1-97, Vol. B). It was evidenced that:
with respect to the total tract, Darrell Hafen, in
June, 1960, entered into an option to purchase the
same from Neilsen, et ux. (185.09 acres and water
rights) for $100,000.00 payable $30,000.00 cash and
$10,000.00 corporate stock down payment and the balance of $60,000.00 under contract (Exs. D-1, D-2, Tr.
5, 27, 28, 29, Vol. B);
1.

2. it was agreed that upon exercise of the option,
Hafen could select 40 of the 185.09 acres as to which
title would be transferred upon advancement of the
down payment (Tr. 6, 15, Vol. B, Exs. D-1 and D-2);
3. at the time the option was executed, both Hafen
and Neilson were aware of the then contemplated
highway program, and that the same would necessitate the purchase of a substantial portion of the 185.09
acres (Tr. 32, 33, 67, Vol. B);
4. in June, 1962, Hafen exercised the option by payment of $29,000.00 cash, a post-dated check of $1,000.00 and escrowed stock (Tr. 29, 37, Vol. B);
5. Hafen selected 40 acres to be conveyed and on
June 25, 1962 (barely 90 days before the condemnation
action was instituted), Neilson, et ux., executed a warranty deed running to Bryant S. Jacobs, one of Hafen's
associates (Ex. P-1 p. 34, Tr. 29, 30);
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6. of the 40 acres under the deed, 33.33 acres was a
precise replica which the State of Utah, within 90
days thereafter, was to condemn (Tr. 57, Vol. B, R.
3, Ex. P-1 p. 34, 35, and 36);
7. the description which Hafen utilized for the Neilson to Jacobs conveyance was secured from the Property Acquisition Division of the State Highway Department (Tr. 55, 56);
8. Both Neilson and Hafen knew that the 40 acre
conveyance was inclusive of the public right of way
description (Tr. 32, 33, 94);
9. the legal description of Parcel No. 162A and the
Neilson-Jacobs deed is unique insomuch that it cuts
angularly across section lines and requires that the
tie be made at the center line of "present" Highway 91
(Tr. 63, Vol. B, R. 3).
Upon the evidence, the Court found that the option
to purchase the 185.09 acres for $100,000.00 had been exercised in June, 1962, that a down payment had been made
thereon approximating $30,000.00 to $40,000.00, and that
Hafen, Jacobs and associates, at the date of condemnation,
owned Parcel No. 162A with the residue under contract
(R. 51-54, and supp. letter, R. 54-55).
Subsequently at the trial on matters relating to evaluation, the appellants proposed to show contemplated and
special plans for the use of the total tract including the
condemned acreage, the proffer ranging from motel and
subdivision sites to golf courses (Tr. 149, 150, 165, 196, Vol.
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C). The Court, upon objection, denied the proffers (Tr. 62,
151, 166, 198, Vol. C). As an ancillary feature, appellants
attempted to prove a use of the subject property, at the
date of condemnation, foreign and collaterial to actual
usage or the legally pern1issible uses under the zoning ordinances then in effect in Washington County (Tr. 129,
136); also, a proffer was made of alleged probable annexation of the subject property by the Town of Washington
(Tr. 162, 163, Vol. C); the same was denied admission by
the Court (Tr. 131, Vol. C).
Appellants based their approach to value, thereafter,
upon use of the condemned acreage for residential-farm
purposes (Tr. 219, Vol. C, 1. 16-28). Their sole evaluation
witness, Keipe, opinionated that the value of the expropriated area, at the control date, was $67,000.00, or $2,000.00
per acre (Tr. 209, Vol. C); the witness concluded that although a partial taking was present, the residuary or remaining land had not been prejudiced by the acquisition of
the 33.33 acres 7 since the benefits flowing from the construction of the public improvement more than offset any
depreciating affect (Tr. 216-217, Vol. C). Neither Mr.
Keipe nor the appellants, during their case in chief, elicited
the sale of any properties deemed comparable to the subject acreage ( Tr. 112-246, Vol. C) .
At the conclusion of appellants' case in chief, the State
of Utah called as its first witness Mr. Higginson of the
State Engineer's Office who testified concerning the spring
sources of water appurtenant to the Neilson total tract
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( Tr. ~52, Vol. C) and the places and purposes of use of
said water under the Virgin River Decree of 1926 (Tr.
256, 257, 258, Vol. C, Ex. D-6, Ent. 177, 178, 179) . In addition, Mr. Higginson testified as to the point of diversion
and availability of water from Sand Hollow Creek on the
condemned property (Tr. 258, Vol. C). As to the former,
it was evidenced that the property under condemnation
had available to it .69 c.f.s. of spring water for agricultural usage only; as to the latter, the subject property was
devoid of all sources of water from Sand Hollow Creek.
Employees of the State Department of Health subsequently testified that a qualitative analysis had been made
by that Department of the spring water appurtenant to
the condemned acreage (Tr. 284, Vol. C) pursuant to the
standards of the U. S. Public Health Service (Tr. 303, Vol.
C) ; their findings revealed arsenic, chloride and sulfate
contents to such an extent that the water was not suitable
for culinary purposes ( Tr. 303, Vol. C) .
Finally, State of Utah called three evaluation witnesses, C. Francis Solomon, Jr., Edmund D. Cook and·
Wallace Iverson; their opinions were uniform, that highest and best use of the subject property at the date of condemnation was for agricultural and related purposes (Tr.
368, 313). Each witness testified as to comparable sales of
neighboring property which they considered in gauging the
fair market value of the property being acquired by the
public authority (Tr. 314-319, 379, Vol. C). Respectively,
their estimates of value were :
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a.

b.

Solomon

1.

Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$16,000.00
($400-$600 per acre)

2.

Severance damage ---~-----------------------,------------None

3.

Total opinion --------------------------------------$16,000.00
(Tr. 373-379, Vol. C)

Cook
1.

Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$13,332.00
($400 per acre)
·

2.

Severance damage ________________________________________ None

Total Opinion --------------------------------------------$13,332.00
(Tr. 312, Vol. C)
c.

Iverson

1.
2.
3.

Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$10,666.00
( $200-$400 per acre)
Severance damage ______________________________________ None
Total opinion --------------------------------------$10,666.00
(Tr. 426-428, Vol. C)

At the close of the evidence and upon motion by the
State, the Court ruled that benefits, severance and consequential damage were not an issue and would not be submitted to the jury (Tr. 434, Vol. C). On the 17th day of
April, 1963 the panel of eight jurors returned into Court
its answer to the special interrogatory by unanimous assent:
''1. What was the fair market value on September 20, 1962 of the tract of land sought to be
condemned herein by the State of Utah containing
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33 plus acres of land not including any water
rights?
"Answer: $16,000. 00."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE OF
THE NEILSON PROPERTY WAS IMMATERIAL.
(A)

The sale price for the 185.09 acres was received.

(B)

Appellants' attempt to say that the partial payment approximating $40,000.00 was, itself, a sale
is not legitimate.

A graphic illustration of the good faith which the appellants bring to this appeal is on display in Point II of
their Brief (pp. 6-8). It is said that the testimony of
Hafen in connection with the down payment of $40,000.00
and the conveyance of 40 acres upon exercise of the option to purchase the 185.09 acres for $100,000.00 was, itself, a sale which should have been received on the issue of
market value :

"* * * The Court refused to permit defendant-appellant, Roadrunner Inn to show the
amount it had contracted to pay for the property.
* * *" (App. Brief p. 4.)
The intent of the appellants to portray the down payment
as a sale was further shown by questions relating to down
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payment, and the amount remaining due under the contract
(pp. 115-121).
This Court has in past times, made its position known
relative to the admissibility of prior sales of the property
under appraisement as. well as sales of comparable land.
State V. Romer and Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76
(1961); Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Ward, 10
U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959); Southern Pacific Company
V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State of
Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953). In Peek,
it was declared that upon a proper foundation being laid,
sales of property determined to be comparable were admissible on direct examination as substantive evidence as
well as on cross-examination for impeachment purposes.
Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur again produced this
result. In the Ward decision, the Court considered a prior
sale of the condemned property and in so doing expressed
an affirmative vote for the admissibility of the sale so
long as it was related in point of time and market. Lastly,
the Court, in State v. Peterson, held that the weight given
to a sale once admitted, was a question for the trier of fact.
See also Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5 # 21.3 p.
417. The law of land damage cases is silent in support of
the claim that a down payrnent on the purchase price of a
particular tract (a conveyance of a portion thereof being
made simultaneously) is in any event a sale warranting
consideration as an endice of value.
At one point in the trial, appellants' counsel allowed
that, indeed, the alleged payment of $40,000.00 was but a
partial payment:
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"MR. FULLER: Your Honor, none of these
questions relative to partial payment are designed
to establish any price"THE COURT: All right.
"MR. FULLER: -or anything that's been
conveyed, so you will understand our position.
"THE COURT: Yes."
Set in this light, appellants' Point on appeal is void of efficacy.
There is small doubt that Hafen made an attempt to
manufacture a sale, inclusive of the condemned tract, of
40 acres for $40,000.00. Testimony makes it abundantly
clear that the option of 1960 was executed at a time when
the parties were aware of the eminency of the highway improvement across the Neilson farm, although unaware of
its precise location; that the option (drawn by Hafen)
permitted the latter, upon exercise, to select 40 acres for
conveyance in consideration of the down payment of $40,000.00 or its equivalent; that the option was exercised
within 90 days prior to the commencement of condemnation proceedings and at a time when the Utah Highway
Department was negotiating for the purchase of the 33.33
acres; that upon exercise of the option, the landowner conveyed by deed the 40 acres selected by Hafen, 33.33 acres
of which was a carbon copy of the State's right-of-way
description; that Hafen obtained said description from the
Utah Highway Department. The goal of this conspiracy
of facts was the creation of an artificial land value; the
effort was unrewarding in product.
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The appellants cite a portion of the transcript to but.
tress the assertion that the lower Court "instructed" the
jury that the sale of the subject property was not material
to the issues of market value (see App. Brief p. 7); the
quotation is placed far from the setting and circumstances
under which it was made. A quick glance at the testimony
readily reveals that the statement of the Court was to the
effect that so long as a contract was entered into for the
purchase of the 185.09 acres between Hafen as a willing
buyer and Neilson as a willing seller, that fact, alone, was
germane to question of value and, therefore, the amount
of the initial or down payment on the purchase price was
neither material or relevant to the proceedings.
On more than one occasion, the Court recognized the
sale of the 185.09 acres. The transcript itself is a witness
to this fact:
"MR. FULLER : And who was the proposed
seller under that option?
"MR. HAFEN : Israel Neilson and Cattie Neilson were the proposed sellers.
"MR. FULLER : And who was the proposed
buyers?
"MR. HAFEN: Myself.

"*

*

*

"MR. FULLER : Now pursuant to that contract, did you undertake to commence purchasing
all or part of the 185 acre tract of land?
"MR. HAFEN : Yes, we did exercise this option.
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"MR. FULLER : And up to-according to the
contract, what was the total purchase price for the
185 acres?
"MR. HAFEN: $100,000.00."
(Tr. 114, Vol. C)
And on cross-examination of the State's witness, C.
Francis Solomon, Jr. :
"MR. FULLER: And that's what I am getting
at. Do people ordinarily incur a purchase of $100,000.00 worth of property hoping to benefit from a
highway that divides their property into three
pieces? Has that been your experience?
"MR. SOLOMON: No, but they do option it
gambling on the hopes that maybe the highway will
come through. And this was an option on a gamble
and not binding the purchaser at the time of the
option."
The judgment of the lower Court should stand affirmed.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ADMISSION OF FUTURE PLANS AND SCHEMES
OF APPELLANTS.
(A)

Said plans are speculative, conjectural and personal, and bear no relationship to market value.

Appellants allege as error the failure of the Court to
admit in evidence plans and drawings for prospective and
future use of the condemned property (App. Brief pp. 812). Offered was the testimony of a golf course architect
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who had proposed plans for "laying out a nine-hole golf
course on the area," plans "for the development of motel
units on the property, club house, and administration building" and the establishment of "lakes, a swimming pool and
other facilities" (Tr. 166, Vol. C). At the date of evaluation, the subject property was farm ground, had so been
for 100 years or more, was zoned by the governing authority for agricultural and grazing utilization and resided
within an agricultural and grazing community.
True enough, a portion of the condemned area passed
through an acreage previously dedicated in subdivided lots
known as the Whitehead Survey (Tr. 328, Vol. B, Ex. P-2);
however, the dedication had taken place prior to 1875, and
had been totally ignored thereafter. Its fruition as subdivided property, therefore, was not exactly accelerated. It
was in this setting that appellants made their proffer to
show future plans and schemes.
In this State, all property subject to condemnation, is
to be evaluated at the control date, that is, the date of service of Summons. State Road Commission v. Valentine, 10
U. 2d 132, 349 P. 2d 321 (1960); 78-34-11, U. C. A. 1953.
While actual use of the considered property is not necessarily the only test of highest and best use (Shurtleff V.
Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21, 82 P. 2d 561) and the testimony adduced must be within the boundaries of the reasonably foreseeable future ( ~Veber Basin Conservancy District
v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959)), market value
can not rest upon prospective and speculative developments. Olsen v. U. S., 292 U. S. 246, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L.
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Ed. 1236; Hewitt v. New York, 118 A. D. 2d 1128, 239 N.
Y. S. 2d 522 (1963). Orgel in his work on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Vol. 1, p. 152, # 31, makes the
following analysis :
"The courts have been at considerable pains to
exclude from consideration those mere possibilities
which they regard as so remote and unlikely that
they could hardly enhance the price at which the
property could have been sold down to the date of
the tr·ial. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
Pipe dreams and personal schemes of the particular
landowner have no association with market value or to that
price which the willing and informed buyer and seller
would agree upon. Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N. E. 2d 148; Nichols on Eminent
Domain, Vol. 4, p. 152, # 12.314 states the rule:
"Evidence may be adduced showing only the
naturally adapted uses of the property in its present
condition. The owner's actual plans or hopes for
the future are completely irrelevant. Such matters
are regarded as too remote and speculative to merit
consideration. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
Were the law otherwise, the personal plans and hopes of the
owner, himself, would become the test of market value and
the land would thereby be appraised for value to that personal landowner. Such test is alien to the universally accepted definition of market value (willing buyer and
seller). Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State v. Noble, 8 U. 2d 405, 335
P. 2d 831 (1959).
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Market value means a sale under ordinary and usual
circumstances, Louisiana State Highway Commission v.
Israel, 205 La. 669, 17 So. 2d- 914 (1944), and the proposition of the appellants for motel and related commercial
development did not meet this standard. Its scope was
speculative, conjectural, and hypothetical in the best form.
Appellants cite to the Court Kennecott Copper Cor.
poration v. Salt Lake County, 112 Utah 418, 215 P. 2d 933
(1952) as authority for the argument that "special" plans
of the landowner and special use is relevant on land evaluation matters; it is set forth in their Brief (p. 11) that this
Court in that decision made a specific statement in connec..
tion with "special purposes·' being considered. In actuality,
the statement was not one from this Court but a phrase
taken from 18 Am. Jur. 885, Eminent Domain, Sec. 247.
What's more, is the fact that the quotation is deceitfully
displayed in appellants' Brief in that sentences from the
encyclopedia are drawn together out of context and without
appropriate asterisk or paragraph designation (app. Brief
pp. 11-12). A part of the paragraph which the appellants
deleted in their commentary on "special" purposes follows:
"While market value is always the ultimate test~
it occasionally happens that the property taken is of
a class not commonly bought and sold, as a church
or a college or a cemetery or the fee of a public
street, or some other piece of property which may
have an actual value to the owner, but which under
ordinary conditions he would be unable to sell for
an amount even approximating its real value. As
market value presupposes a willing buyer, the usual
test breaks down in such a case, and hence it is
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sometimes said that such property has no market
value. In one sense this is true; but it is certain
that for that reason it cannot be taken for nothing.
From the necessity of the case the value must be
arrived at from the opinions of well-informed persons, based upon the purposes for which the property is suitable. This is not taking the 'value in use'
to the owner as contradistinguished from the market value. * * * The market value, and not
the value for such special purpose or the value to
the party seeking to condemn it, is the measure of
damages. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
The facts of the Kennecott deciison are the distinguishing
mark with the case at bar; therein, property, under assessment by the County, had been utilized as a tailings dump
and the plaintiff contended that that special use was determinative as to value. The argument was rejected.
This respondent has no quarrel with the holding of
this Court in Salt Lake County, Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, 11 U. 2d 232, 357 P. 2d 486 (1960), when
offered for the express purpose as stated therein, i.e., severance damage.
Prospective and future plans have, generally, been
disregarded. In Redondo Beach School District of Los Angeles County v. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957), the
landowner attempted to prove future plans to develop the
condemned property in a particular fashion. The California Court, in denying permission of the same, commented:
"Coming to appellant's last contention, apparently appellant attempted to subdivide the property
in some way or other and ultimately to subdivide
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all of it,
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ment of
material

but the usual rule in eminent domain prois that a proposed plan for the developthe property proposed to be taken is not
on the issue of market value."

See also Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S., 282, 13 S.
Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170; Redwood City Elementary School
District v. Gregorie, 276 P. 2d 78 (Cal. 1954). In a recent
decision, Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305,
383 P. 2d 917 ( 1963) this Court said :

"* * * The valuation must be on the basis
of what a willing purchaser would pay now and
not what a number of purchasers might be induced
to pay in the future for the land in small parcels.
* * *"
Point III of appellant's Brief has no foundation.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE PEREPHERY OF THE USES TO WHICH THE PROPERTY MIGHT HAVE BEEN APPLIED AT
THE DATE OF CONDEMNATION.
Finally, appellants argue that prejudicial error was
committed in rejecting evidence bearing on highest and
best use which was agnostic to the actual use or available
uses under the zoning ordinances of Washington County.
Although their selected quotations appear, again, out of
the context and environment in which they arose (contemptuously suggesting the trial Court had stated the position of the State app. Brief 14, 15), it is readily stipu-
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lated that the Court was of a view that as to the condemned
area, the perimeter of the testimony on highest and best
use was governed by actual usage as well as that permissible under the County zoning regulations. In an attempt
to introduce plans of commercial and subdivision development, appellants claimed that the zoning ordinances were
inconsistent one with the other, that they were not in the
public interest and were hence invalid (Tr. 163, Vol. B);
further, that subsequent to the date of condemnation and
prior to trial, the subject tract had been annexed to the
Town of Washington (Tr. 163, Vol. B, app. Brief p. 17);
and that a golf course architect was prohibited from projecting plans for the construction of a golf course on the
subject properties as well as explaining the urgency of
need for "a golf course in the St. George area" (app. Brief
p. 26).
As to the first specification above, it is not the landowners' province in a land damage suit to collaterally attack the validity of a zoning ordinance. Robinson v. Comm.
of Massachusetts, 141 N. E. 2d 727 (Mass. 1956); Long
Beach City High School District v. Stewart, 30 Cal. 2d
763, 185 P. 2d 585, 173 A. L. R. 249 (1947); 61 Harv. L.
Rcc. 707 (1947). Counsel's statement that the zoning ordinances were not in the public interest because they were
"very new in the county" fails all logic, for it is presumed
that enacted legislation of recent origin had been considered in the light of recent property development, as opposed
to zoning ordinances existent and unchanged over a period
of several decades. On the second argument, no proffer
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was made to show that any alleged annexation had occurred pursuant to 10-3-1 U. C. A. 1953. Moreover, no
portion of the land under condemnation was within or contiguous to the Town of Washington at the date of condemnation (Ex. P-1).
As to the third specification, the architect, Bell, was
never qualified as a land economist, as a community developer, or as a real estate appraiser, broker or salesman
(Tr. 197, 198, Vol. B); rather, Bell's qualifications ran
solely to that of a golf course architect. As explained by
appellants, the witness's function was to explain the plans
of a proposed golf course on the subject property, respondent's answer thereto being covered heretofore in Point
II of this Brief.
Section 78-34-11, U. C. A. 1953, keynotes any discussion on the rule of law in this area :
"For the purpose of .assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of service of summons,
and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually
taken, and the basis of damages to property not
actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the
next preceding section. * * *"
The mandate of the statute requires that the property
be appraised in the light in which it was found at the date
of service of summons, its amenities, advantages and shortcomings to be weighed as of that time. The evaluation proceeding is not the forum for speculative and. hypothetical
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conditions, unrelated to fact, which may attach to the condemned premises months, years or decades after the date
of condemnation. Awards based on speculation are subject to reversal. Williams v. City and County of Denver,
363 P. 2d 171 (Colo. 1961).
The great weight of authority sustains the principle
that evaluation of property in land damage litigation must
be within the circumference of legal and authorized uses.
Reindollar ·v. Gaiser, 195 Md. 314, 73 A. 2d 493 ( 1950).
In Long Beach City High School District v. Stewart, 30
Cal. 2d 763, 185 P. 2d 585, 173 A. L. R. 249 (1947), the
California Court said:
"In other words, the general rule is that present market value must ordinarily be determined by
consideration only of the uses for which the land is
adapted and for which it is available."

In the early case of City of Seattle v. Byers, 54 Wash. 518,
103 Pac. 791, it was held that the landowner could not, as
a matter of law, prove that the existence of a "cul-de-sac"
would be vacated at some indefinite time in the future;
such evidence was regarded as speculative and without the
realm of admissibility.
The special commercial and residential uses advanced
by appellants were, at the date of assessment, prohibited
and unauthorized. Highest and best use in eminent domain
is dependent upon a nomistic use of land; as said in Port
of New York Authority v. Howell, 157 A. 2d 731 (N. J.
1960) :
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"The landowner is entitled to receive a fair
price for any permitted use for which the land has
a commercial value of its own in the immediate present or in reasonable anticipation in the near future. This concerns the market value, having a reasonably anticipated, permitted use in view. The
rule limits the proof to the value of the land as of
the control date, i.e., the date of taking, in the condition of the land at that time and to the uses to
which it is naturally adapted and restricted. It excludes speculative and possible uses if improvements
and changes were made. * * *
"Buildings, trees, shrubs, topsoil, etc., underlying stone, sand and gravel are component parts of
the land and are not to be valued separately apart
from the land, but it may be shown to what extent
the land is enhanced in value thereby, subject, of
course, to the use restrictions imposed by valid local
zoning regulations; citing authorities * * * "
(Emphasis added.)

No Foundation
Appellants would have the instant case fit within an
exception to the general rule, such being, that probability
of rezoning may be shown. Each case cited by appellants
requires a preliminary foundation of probability before the
evidence can go to the trier of fact. See for example,
People v. Donovan, 396 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1962); Washington
v. Motor Freight Terminals, Inc., 357 P. 2d 861 (Wash.
1960). The Michigan Supreme Court, in Mackie, State
Highway Comm. v. Eil~nder, 362 Mich. 697, 108 N. W. 2d
755' (1961), cited by appellants, recognized the general
rule:
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u* * * We look at the value of the condemned land at the time of taking, not as of some
future date. If the land is then zoned so as to exclude more lucrative uses, such use is ordinarily immaterial in arriving at just compensation. * * *"
In Mackir, a pending zoning change was under consideration by the zoning authority at the date the property was
condemned. No such element is associated with the subject
property in Washington County. Even were it assumed
that this Court would recognize the exception to the general rule as stated herein, appellants wholly failed to lay
a preliminary foundation showing the eminency of a zoning change. In State v. Holt, 14 U. 2d 235, 381 P. 2d 724
(1963), the Court found that the valuation of the property
in question was governed by the zoning ordinance in affect
at the date of condemnation and as in the instant situation,
no foundation of probability was laid. Appellants' attempt
to distinguish that decision from this case is uneventful.
In Maynard v. City of N orthhampton, 157 Mass. 218,
31 N. E. 1062, the proper basis for assessing compensation
in eminent domain was recorded:

"* * * In determining damages in a case
of this kind, the jury should consider not only the
value of the property taken, but also the affect of
the taking upon that which is left; and in estimating the value of that which is taken, they may consider all the uses to which it might properly have
been applied if it had not been taken." (Emphasis
added.)
(A)

Acceleration in land value estimates cannot, at
law. be founded upon an unauthorized use.
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Appellants assert that the proscribed uses involving
plans for commercial and subdivision development entitle
them to a higher consideration of value than that otherwise found for agricultural purposes; that is to say specifically, that permissible uses under the zoning ordinances or
nonconforming use would not underpin a value of $2,000.00
an acre while prospective and future commercial and residential plans would justify such conclusion. Appellants'
own authorities deny them the relief which they seek.
Sackman, author of Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.),
in a paper delivered before the Southwestern Legal Foundation in April, 1963, said :
"The proposition is, of course, fundamental
that, insofar as existing zoning restrictions circumscribe the available uses to which the land may be
devoted, they unquestionably affect the market
value of the property. No evidence in support of
an enhanced value may be admitted where suck
value would be the result of a proscribed use." (Emphasis added.) Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on Eminent Domain, 1963, Mathew Bender
and Co.
To the same affect, see State of Arizona v. McMinn, 88
Ariz. 261, 355 P. 2d 900 (1960), a decision cited by appellants. The case made by the appellants at $2,000.00 an
acre was as barren for supporting data as the land under
appraisement and would have remained so, even had the
speculative special uses been admitted.
(B)

Appellants' case was fully submitted on the
basis that highest and best use was limited residential-small farm acreages.
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When Keipe took the witness stand in behalf of the
appellants, he was asked on direct examination to base his
opinion on highest and best use for limited residential use
in connection with small farm acreages (Tr. 219, Vol. B).
Thereafter, Keipe testified that the subject property had
a market value of $2,000.00 an acre, as of September 20,
1962 for that use. Appellants now claim on appeal thatI
the condemned parcel could be best used for commercial
and subdivision purposes. Appellants' theory is to say that
property has more than one highest and best use; that if
they are not able to get to the jury on one use, they may
adopt a second use and thereafter raise as error on appeal
the denial of the first.
Appellants' have had their day in court; upon being
advised of the Court's ruling relative to the exclusion of
proposed commercial and subdivision evidence, they could
have rested their case at that time and taken their appeal.
In lieu thereof, appellants chose to have their evaluation
witness attach a value to the property, the highest and
best use being for a less intensified purpose. Their theory
gives them two chances at bat, the first to go to the jury
with the value of $2,000.00 an acre on the basis of limited
residential use and second, that if the jury found the evidence against them, to appeal on the basis of a different
and inconsistent usage of the property. Their approach is
reminiscent of a chameleon-and highest and best use for
their purposes has been placated to serve momentary convenience. Appellants submitted their case to the Court
and jury on a specific basis. They should not now be heard
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to complain because the jury found the weight of evidence
contrary to their position. Ray v. Consolidated Freight
Ways, 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196 (1955). The rule of evidence that a party may not allege as error on appeal testimony which he, himself, fostered is well recognized:
"As a general rule, a party is bound by uncontradicted evidence produced by him to prove a particular fact or facts; and where he introduces a
witness to testify on his behalf he ordinarily vouches
for the credibility of his witness, and, in the absence
of contradictory evidence, is bound by such testimony, although the testimony was objected to by
the adverse party. In accordance with this rule, a
party who has introduced certain evidence cannot
subsequently object that it should not have been
received, * * *." 32 C. J. S. 1104, Evidence
# 1040; Romero v. Turnell, 68 N. M. 362, 362 P.
2d 515 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
POINT IV.
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
(A)

Appellants did not meet their Burden of Proof
and Persuasion on Matters of Evaluation.

Although the public agency stands before the Court as
the plaintiff, on issues of evaluation and compensation the
landowners carry the burden of going forward with the
evidence, the burden of proof and the ultimate burden of
persuasion. State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317,
366 P. 2d 76 (1961). Not only did appellants fall short
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of these requirements, but the more believable testimony
pointed to the case of the State. The lone evaluation witnss
of appellants was outmatched by the credibility and soundness that permeated the evidence presented by the trio of
witnesses, Solomon, Cook, and Iverson, appearing for the
respondent.
It is fair to say that appellants were not penalized by
the award of condemnation. Barely 90 days before the
date of condemnation, Hafen agreed to purchase from Neilson for $100,000.00 under long term contract 185.09 acres
and water rights appurtenant. Without disturbing the
water flow, the judgment requires the State to pay to
appellants $16,000.00 cash for the acquisition of 33.33
acres of the larger unit. That the appellants are not entitled to profit on the condemnation transaction at the expense of the public was settled by this Court in State of
Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028:

"* * * A condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit on his property. It must go to the condemnor for its fair market value, as is, irrespective
of any claimed value based on an aggregate of values of individual lots in a subdivision * * * "
This Court is not prone to interfere with the finding
of the trier of fact unless such is inconsistent with the
manifest import of the evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174; McCollum v. Clothier,
121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468. In reaching that verdict, the
instructions by the trial Court to the panel were proper
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and correct, the strength of this statement resting in the
fact that appellants do not raise as error any instruction.
Instruction No. 16, as given, was an accurate statement of
the law relating to the zoning ordinances of Washington
County at the date of assessment.
CONCLUSION
The accompanying drawing is illustrative of the land
plottage incident to the trial of the matter. The basic sketch
is evidentiary of the Neilson total tract prior to the date
of expropriation as affected by "present" Highway 91. The
property description (in brown color) on the first overlay
represents the 40 acres selected by Hafen under the Neilson option of June, 1962. The second and last overlay
(shown in green) displays the State right-of-way description which was incorporated into the condemnation complaint filed in September, 1962.
The trial of this matter resulted in a fair hearing to
all parties. Appellants went to the jury with limited residential land use as the theory of their case and value based
thereon; this was a decision of their own making, a choice
made in litigation which cannot be now abandoned or recanted.
Future plans and schemes for development by the appellants are personal to themselves, and have no place in
a proceeding to determine market value. The unanimous
opinion of the jury affixing market value met all the requirements of "just compensation."
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The judgment of the lower Court should be, by this
Court, affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
Special Assistant
Attorney General,
C. F. WILLIAMS,
Of Counsel,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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